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ABSTRACT
Ongoing questions on the historical mean and standard deviation of the return on equities and  bonds  and  on  the
equilibrium demand for these securities are addressed in the context of a stationary, overlapping-generations economy in
which consumers are subject to a borrowing constraint.  The key feature captured by the OLG economy is that the bulk of
the future income of the young consumers is derived from their wages forthcoming in their middle age, while the bulk of
the future income of the middle-aged consumers is derived from their savings in equity and bonds.  The young would like
to borrow and invest in equity but the borrowing constraint prevents them from doing so.  The middle-aged choose to
hold a diversified portfolio that includes positive holdings of bonds and this explains the demand for bonds.  Without
the borrowing constraint, the young borrow and invest in equity, thereby decreasing the mean equity premium and
increasing the rate of interest.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The question as to why the historical equity premium is so high and the real rate of
interest is so low was addressed in Mehra and Prescott (1985).  They demonstrated that the
equilibrium of a reasonably parameterized, representative-consumer exchange economy is able to
furnish a mean annual premium of equity return over the riskless rate of, at most, 0.35%, in
contrast to its historical level of 6% in U.S. data.  Furthermore, the equilibrium annual riskless
rate of interest is consistently too high, about 4%, as opposed to the observed 1% in U.S. data.
1 
Further, in econometric tests the conditional Euler equations of per capita consumption, is also
rejected by Hansen and Singleton (1982), Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), Ferson and
Constantinides (1991) and others.
Several generalizations of key features of the Mehra and Prescott (1985) model have been
proposed to better reconcile observations with theory.  These include alternative assumptions on
preferences,
2 modified probability distributions to admit rare but disastrous events,
3 incomplete
markets,
4 and market imperfections;
5 none have fully  resolved the  anomalies.    Cochrane and
Hansen (1992) and Kocherlakota (1996) provide excellent surveys of this literature.
The novelty of the paper lies in incorporating a life-cycle feature to study asset pricing. 
The  idea is  appealingly  simple.    The  attractiveness  of  equity  as  an  asset  depends  on  the
correlation between consumption and equity income.  If equity pays off in states of high marginal
utility of consumption, it will command a higher price, (and consequently a lower rate of return),
than  if  its  payoff  is  in  states  where  marginal  utility  is  low.    Since  the  marginal  utility  of
                     
1 This point is emphasized in Weil (1989).
2 For example, Abel (1990), Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (1996), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999), Constantinides (1990), Daniel and Marshall (1997), Epstein and Zin (1991), and Ferson and Constantinides
(1991).
3 See, Rietz (1988) and Mehra and Prescott (1988).
4 For example, Bewley (1982), Constantinides and Duffie (1996), Detemple and Serrat (1996), Heaton and Lucas (1997,
2000), Krusell and Smith (1998), Lucas (1994), Mankiw (1986), Marcet and Singleton (1999), Mehra and Prescott (1985),
Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (1999), and Telmer (1993).  Empirical papers that investigate the role of incomplete
markets on asset prices include Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (1999), Cogley (1999), Jacobs (1999), and Vissing-
Jorgensen (1999).
5 For example, Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Alvarez and Jerman (1997), Bansal and Coleman (1996), Basak and Cuoco
(1998), Brav and Geczy (1995), Danthine, Donaldson and Mehra (1992), He and Modest (1995), Heaton and Lucas (1996),
Luttmer (1996), McGrattan and Prescott (2000,2001), and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (1999).  Empirical papers that
investigate the role of limited participation, as a manifestation of market imperfections, on asset prices include Attanasio,
Banks and Tanner (1998), Brav and Geczy (1995), Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (1999), Cogley (1999), Jacobs (1999),
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), and Vissing-Jorgensen (1999).2
consumption varies inversely with consumption, equity will command a high rate of return if it
pays off in states when consumption is high, and vice versa.
6
A key insight of our paper is that as the correlation of equity income with consumption
changes over the life cycle of an individual, so does the attractiveness of equity as an asset. 
Consumption can be decomposed into the sum of wages and equity income.  A young person
looking  forward  in  his  life has  uncertain future  wage  and  equity  income;  furthermore,  the
correlation of equity income with consumption will not be particularly high, as long as stock and
wage income are not highly correlated.  This is empirically the case, as documented by Davis and
Willen (2000).  Equity will thus be a hedge against fluctuations in wages and a “desirable” asset
to hold as far as the young are concerned.
The same asset (equity) has a very different characteristic for the middle aged.  Their
wage uncertainty has largely been resolved.  Their future retirement wage income is either zero or
deterministic and the innovations (fluctuations) in their consumption occur from fluctuations in
equity  income.    At  this  stage  of  the  life  cycle,  equity  income  is  highly  correlated  with
consumption.  Consumption is high when equity income is high, and equity is no longer a hedge
against fluctuations in consumption; hence, for this group, it requires a higher rate of return.
The  characteristics  of  equity  as  an  asset  therefore  change,  depending  on  who  the
predominant holder of the equity is.  Life cycle considerations thus become crucial  for  asset
pricing.  If equity is a “desirable” asset  for  the  marginal  investor  in  the  economy,  then  the
observed equity premium will be low, relative to an economy where the marginal investor finds it
unattractive to hold equity.  The deus ex machina is the stage in the life cycle of the marginal
investor.
In this paper, we argue that the young, who should be holding equity in an economy
without frictions and with complete contracting, are effectively shut out of this market because
of borrowing constraints.  They are characterized by  low  wages;  ideally they  would  like to
smooth lifetime consumption by borrowing against future wage income (consuming a part of the
                     
6 This is precisely the reason why high-beta stocks in the simple CAPM framework have a high rate of return.  In that
model, the return on the market is a proxy for consumption.  High-beta stocks pay off when the market return is high, i.e.3
loan and investing the rest in higher return equity).  However, as is well recognized, they are
prevented from doing so because human capital alone does not collateralize major loans in modern
economies for reasons of moral hazard and adverse selection.
In the presence of borrowing constraints, equity is thus exclusively priced by the middle-
aged investors since the young are effectively excluded from the equity markets and we observe a
high equity premium.  If the borrowing constraint is relaxed, the young will borrow to purchase
equity, thereby raising the bond yield.  The increase in the bond yield induces the middle-aged to
shift their portfolio holdings from equity to bonds.  The increase in the demand for equity by the
young and the decrease in the demand for equity by the middle-aged work in opposite directions.
On balance, the effect is to increase both the equity and the bond return while simultaneously
shrinking the equity premium.  Furthermore, the relaxation of the borrowing constraint reduces
the net demand for bonds and the risk free rate puzzle re-emerges.
In order to systematically illustrate these ideas, we construct an overlapping-generations
(OLG) exchange economy in which consumers live for three periods.  In the first period, a period
of human capital acquisition, the consumer receives a relatively low endowment income.  In the
second period, the consumer is employed and receives wage income subject to large uncertainty.
In the third period, the consumer retires and consumes the assets accumulated in  the  second
period.  We explore the implications of a borrowing constraint by deriving and contrasting the
stationary equilibria in two versions of the economy.  In the borrowing-constrained version, the
young  are  prohibited  from  borrowing  and  from  selling  equity  short.    The  borrowing-
unconstrained economy differs from the borrowing-constrained one only in that the borrowing
constraint and the short-sale constraint are absent.
Our model introduces two forms of market incompleteness.   First,  consumers  of  one
generation are prohibited from trading claims against their future wage income with consumers of
another generation.
7  Second, consumers of one generation are prohibited from trading bonds and
equity with consumers of an unborn generation.  Our model suppresses a third and potentially
                                                                   
when marginal utility is low, hence their price is (relatively) low and their rate of return high.
7 Being homogeneous within their generation, consumers have no incentive to trade claims with consumers of their own4
important form of market incompleteness  that  arises  from  the  inability  of  an  age  cohort  of
consumers to insure via pooling the risks of their persistent, heteroscedastic idiosyncratic income
shocks.
8  Specifically, we model each generation of consumers with a representative consumer. 
This  assumption  is  justified  only  if  there  exists  a  complete  set  of  claims  through  which
heterogeneous consumers within a generation can pool their idiosyncratic income shocks.  Absent
a complete set of such claims, consumer heterogeneity in the form of uninsurable, persistent and
heteroscedastic idiosyncratic income shocks, with  counter-cyclical conditional variance, has the
potential  to  resolve empirical  difficulties encountered by  representative-consumer  models.
9 
Nevertheless, consumer heterogeneity within a generation is downplayed in our model in order to
isolate  and  explore the  implications  of  heterogeneity  across  generations  in  a  parsimonious
paradigm.
The paper is organized as follows.  The economy and equilibrium are defined in Section 2.
 In Section 3, we discuss the calibration of the economy.  In Section 4, we present and discuss the
equilibrium results in both the borrowing-constrained  and  the  unconstrained  economies  for  a
plausible range of parameter values.  Extensions are discussed in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes
the paper.  Technical aspects on the definition of equilibrium, existence of equilibrium, and the
numerical calculations are detailed in the appendices available from the authors.
2.  THE ECONOMY AND EQUILIBRIUM
We consider an overlapping-generations, pure exchange economy.
10  Each generation lives
for three periods as young, middle-aged, and old.  Three is the minimal number of periods that
captures the heterogeneity of consumers across age groups, which we wish to emphasize: the
                                                                   
generation.
8 This perspective is emphasized in Storesletten et al. (1999).  They provide empirical evidence that shocks to the wage
income process indeed have these properties and introduce this type of shocks in their model.  They find that  the
interaction of life cycle effects and the uninsurable wage income shocks plays an important role in generating their results.
 Although they have a borrowing constraint in their model, as we do, it is the uninsurable wage income shocks that drive
their results by deterring the young consumers from investing in equity.  By contrast, in our model, it is the borrowing
constraint exclusively that deters the young consumers from investing in equity.
9 See, Mehra and Prescott (1985), Mankiw (1986) and Constantinides and Duffie (1996).
10 There is a long tradition of OLG models in the literature.  Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) employ a deterministic OLG
model in their study of fiscal policy.  Rios-Rull (1994) employs a stochastic OLG model in his investigation of the role of
market incompleteness on equilibrium allocations. Kurz and Motolese (2000) use the framework to examine rational5
borrowing-constrained young, the saving middle-aged, and the dis-saving old.  In the calibration,
each period is taken to represent twenty years.  We model each generation of consumers with a
representative consumer.  As explained in  the  introduction,  consumer heterogeneity  within  a
generation  is  downplayed  in  our  model in  order  to  isolate  and  explore  the  implications  of
heterogeneity across generations in a parsimonious paradigm.
There is one consumption good in each period and it perishes at the end of the period. 
Wages, consumption, dividends and coupons, as well as the prices of the bonds and equity are
denominated in units of the consumption good.
There are two types of securities in the model, bonds and equity.  Both are infinitely
lived.  We think of bonds as a proxy for long-term government debt.  Each bond pays a fixed
coupon of one unit of the consumption good in every period in perpetuity.
11  The supply of
bonds is fixed at b units.  The aggregate coupon payment is b in every period and represents a
portion of the economy’s capital income.  We denote by q
b
t the ex-coupon bond price in period t.
One perfectly divisible equity share is traded.  It is the claim to the net dividend stream
{dt}, the sum total of all private capital income (stocks, corporate bonds and real estate).  We
denote by q
e
t the ex-dividend share price in period t.  With the supply of equity fixed at one
share in perpetuity, the issue and repurchase of equities and bonds is implicitly accounted for by
the fact that the equity is defined as the claim to the net dividend.  We do not model the method
by which firms determine and finance the net dividend—firms are exogenous to the  exchange
economy.
The consumer born in period t receives deterministic wage income w
0> 0 in period  t,
when young; stochastic wage income w
1
t+1 > 0 in period t+1, when middle aged; and zero wage
income  in  period  t+2,  when  old.    By  making  the  wage  income  process  of  the  middle-aged
consumer exogenous, we abstract from the labor-leisure tradeoff.  Claims on a consumer’s future
wage income are not traded.
A consumer born in period t enters life with zero endowment of the equity and bond. 
                                                                   
beliefs.  See also Huggett (1996) and Storesletten (1999).
11 We also report the  shadow price  of a one-period (20-year) bond in  zero net supply.  Note that it is infeasible to6
The consumer purchases z
e
t,0 shares of stock and z
b
t,0 bonds when young.  The consumer adjusts
these holdings to z
e
t,1 and z
b
t,1 , respectively, when middle aged.  Since we rule out bequests, the
consumer liquidates his/her entire portfolio when old.
12  Thus z
e
t,2 = 0 and z
b
t,2 = 0.
We study and contrast two versions of the economy.  In the unconstrained economy,
consumers are permitted to borrow by shorting the bonds.  They are also permitted to short the
shares  of  stock.    (Negative  holdings  of  either  the  bonds  or  equity  are interpreted  as  short
positions.)    In  the  constrained  economy,  the  consumers  are  forbidden  from  borrowing  by
shorting the bonds.  It is irrelevant whether we allow the consumers to short the equity or not
because a  restriction  on  the  shorting  the  equity  is  non-binding  for  the  particular  range  of
parameters value with which we calibrate the economies.
We denote by ct,j the consumption in period t +j (j = 0, 1, 2) of a consumer born in period
t.  The budget constraint of the consumer born in period t is
ct,0 + z
b
t,0 q
b
t + z
e
t,0 q
e
t £ w
0 (2.1)
when young;
ct,1 + z
b
t,1 q
b
t+1 + z
e
t,1 q
e
t+1 £ w
1
t+1 + z
b
t,0 (q
b
t+1 + b) + z
e
t,0 (q
e
t+1 + dt+1),
(2.2)
when middle-aged; and
ct,2 £ z
b
t,1 (q
b
t+2 + b) + z
e
t,1 (q
e
t+2 + dt+2),
(2.3)
when old.
We also impose the constraints
ct, 0 ³ 0 ,  ct, 1 ³ 0  and  ct, 2 ³ 0 (2.4)
that rule out negative consumption and personal bankruptcy.  They are sometimes referred to as
positive-net-worth constraints.
                                                                   
introduce a one-year bond in this economy because the length of one period is assumed to be 20 years.
12 Ruling out bequests provides a parsimonious way to emphasize the effect of a borrowing constraint on the consumers’7
Underlying the economy there is an increasing sequence {Át: t = 0, 1,...} of information
sets available to consumers in period t.  The information set  Át contains the wage income and
dividend histories  up  to  and  including  period  t.    It  also  contains  the  consumption,  bond
investment, and stock investment histories of all consumers up to and including period t - 1. 
Most of this information turns out to be redundant in the particular stationary equilibria explored
in Section 3.
Consumption and investment policies are such that decisions made in period t depend
only on information available in period t.  Formally, a consumption and investment policy of the
consumer born in period t is defined as the collection of the Át-measurable (ct,0, z
b
t,0, z
e
t,0), the
Át+1-measurable (ct,1, z
b
t,1, z
e
t,1) and the Át+2-measurable ct,2.
The consumer born in period t has expected utility
E
iu ct,i ( )
i=0
2
å | Át
æ 
è  ç 
ö 
ø  ÷  (2.5)
where   is the constant subjective discount factor.
In period t, the old consumers sell their holdings in equity and bonds and consume the
proceeds.  By market clearing, the demand for equity and bonds by the young and middle-aged
consumers must equal the fixed supply of equity and bonds:
z
e
t,0 + z
e
t-1,1 = 1
(2.6)
and
z
b
t,0 + z
b
t-1,1 = b. (2.7)
We conclude the description of the economy by specifying the joint stochastic process of
the wage income and dividend.  As noted earlier, the wage income of the young is a constant w
0
and the wage income of the old is equal to zero.  Instead of specifying the joint process of the
wage income of the middle-aged consumer and the dividend, (w
1
t, dt), we choose to specify the
                                                                   
life-cycle behavior.  This admittedly controversial assumption is extensively discussed in Section 5.8
joint process of the aggregate income and the wages of the  middle-aged,  (yt,  w
1
t),  where  the
aggregate income yt is defined as
yt = w
0 + w
1
t + b + dt .
(2.8)
Our  definition of  aggregate  income  includes the  (constant)  coupon  payment  on  government
debt.
13  For simplicity, we model the joint process of the (de-trended) aggregate income and the
wage  income  of  the  middle-aged  as  a  time-stationary  Markov  chain with  a  non-degenerate,
unique, stationary probability distribution.
14  In the calibration, yt and w
1
t assume two values
each.  The four possible realizations of the pair (yt, w
1
t) are represented by the state variable st =
j, j = 1... 4.  We denote the corresponding 4x4 transition probability matrix as P.
We consider stationary rational expectations equilibria as in Lucas (1978).  Equilibrium is
defined as the set of consumption and investment policies of the consumers born in each period
and  the  Át-measurable  bond  and  stock  prices  q
b
t  and  q
e
t  in  all periods  such  that:  (a)  each
consumer’s consumption and investment policy maximizes the consumer’s expected utility from
the set of admissible policies while taking the price processes as given; and (b) bond and equity
markets clear in all periods.
15
It is beyond the scope of this paper to characterize the full set of such equilibria.  It turns
out, however, that in the borrowing-unconstrained economy there exists  a  stationary  rational
                     
13 This definition appears to differ from the standard definition of the GDP that does not include the coupon payment on
government debt.  We justify our definition of the GDP as follows.  In a more realistic model that takes into account the
taxation of wages and dividend by the government to service its debt, w
0 + w
1
t + dt stands for the sum of the  after-tax
wages and dividend.  The sum of the before-tax wages and dividend is obtained by adding b to the after-tax wages and
dividend, as in equation (2.8).  In any case, the interest on government debt in the US is about 3% of the GDP and the
calibration remains essentially unchanged whether the definition of the GDP includes the term b or not.
14 In the spirit of Lucas (1978), the model abstracts from growth, and considers an economy that is stationary in levels. 
The average growth in total output is thus zero.  Mehra and Prescott (1985), however, study an economy that is stationary
in growth rates and has a unit root in levels.  In their model, the effect of the latter generalization is to increase the mean
return on all financial assets relative to what would prevail, ceteris paribus, in a stationary-in-levels economy, but the
return differentials across different securities are not much affected.  The intuition is as follows: with growth creating
preordained increases in future consumption relative to the present, investors require greater mean  returns  from  all
securities across the board in order to be induced to postpone consumption.  The point of all this is that our life cycle
considerations can be examined in either context; we choose the stationary-in-levels one because it is marginally simpler
computationally, and better matches observed mean return data.  It is also consistent with zero population growth, another
feature of our model.  We have constructed an  analogous  model  where  both  output  and  population  grow  (output
stochastically).  The general results of this paper are duplicated in that setting as well.
15 The characterization of the equilibrium and the proof of existence of a stationary equilibrium are in Appendix A of the
unabridged version of this paper, available from the authors.  The numerical routine for calculating the equilibrium in9
expectations equilibrium in which decisions made in period t and prices in period t are measurable
with respect to the current state st  =  j,  j  =  1,...,4,  and  the  one-period  lagged  state.    These
additional  state  variables  are  present  because  in  every  period,  a  middle-aged  consumer
participates in the securities market and his/her actions are influenced by the securities acquired
when young.
In the borrowing-constrained economy and for the particular range of parameters that we
calibrate the economy, there exists a stationary rational expectations equilibrium in which the
young consumers do not participate in the equity and bond markets.  Decisions made in period t
and prices in period t are measurable with respect to the current state st = j, j = 1...4, alone. 
Lagged  state  variables  are absent  because middle-aged  consumers  do  not  participate  in  the
securities market when young.
16
Since our main results depend crucially on the assumption that borrowing is ruled out,
this assumption merits careful examination.  The borrowing constraint may be challenged because
in reality consumers have the opportunity to purchase equities on margin and purchase index
futures  with  small initial and  maintenance  margins.    They  may  also  borrow  indirectly  by
purchasing the equity of highly levered firms and by purchasing index options.  We investigate
these possibilities in the context of  the  equilibrium  of  borrowing-constrained  economies.    In
Section 5, we report that a very small margin suffices to deter a borrowing-unconstrained young
consumer from purchasing equity on margin, index futures, and highly levered forms of equity. 
Essentially,  a  young  consumer  is  unwilling  to  sacrifice  even  a  small  amount  of  immediate
consumption to put up as margin for the purchase of equity.
For both versions of the model, the common stylized assumptions made on the income
processes enable us to capture three key aspects of reality in a parsimonious way.
17  First, the
wage income received by the young and the old is small compared to the income received by the
                                                                   
both the borrowing-constrained and the unconstrained economies is outlined in Appendix C of the same paper.
16 See Appendix B of the unabridged version of this paper for the proof of existence of an equilibrium and discussion.
17 The simplifying assumption that the wage income of the young is deterministic and common across the young of the
same generation may be relaxed to allow this income to be stochastic and different across  the  young  of  the  same
generation.  Whereas this generalization would certainly increase the realism (and complexity) of the model, it would not
change the basic message of our paper, as long as a sufficiently large fraction of the young were to remain borrowing-
constrained.10
middle-aged.  Therefore, the young would like to borrow against future income and the middle-
aged  would  like  to  save.    However,  the  young  cannot  borrow  because  of  the  borrowing
constraint.  Second, the major future income uncertainty is faced by the young.  It turns out that,
in the equilibrium of most of our borrowing-constrained economies, the equity premium has low
correlation with the wage income that the young expect to receive in their middle age.  The young
would like to borrow and invest in equity but the borrowing constraint prevents them from doing
so.  Third, the saving middle-aged face no wage uncertainty.
18  Therefore, they save by investing
in a portfolio of equities and bonds, driven primarily by the motive of diversification of risk.
3.  CALIBRATION
Period utility is assumed to be of the form
u(c) = (1 - a)
-1 (c
1-a - 1) (3.1)
where  a  >  0  is  the  (constant)  relative risk  aversion coefficient.    We adopt  a  conventional
specification of preferences in order to focus  attention  on  a  different  issue—the  role of  the
borrowing constraint in the context of an overlapping-generations economy—as well as to make
our results directly comparable to the prior literature.
We present results for values of  a = 4, and 6.  We set b = 0.44 for a period of length 20
years.  This corresponds to an annual subjective discount factor of 0.96, which is standard in the
macro-economic literature.
19
The calibration of the joint  Markov  process  on  the  wage  income  of  the  middle-aged
consumers, w
1, and the aggregate income, y, is simplified considerably by the observation that
the equilibrium security prices in the borrowing-constrained economy are linear scale multiples of
                     
18 The simplifying assumption that the wage income of the old is zero may be relaxed to allow for pension income and
social security benefits.  This income and benefits are deterministic from the perspective of the middle-aged consumers;
when incorporated into our analysis, they increase the demand for equity by the middle-aged and reduce the mean equity
premium.  Specifically, the mean equity premium decreases approximately by the factor 1-x, where x is the fraction of
consumption of the old consumers that is derived from these benefits.
19 In the OLG literature, there has been a trend towards calibrating the models with the subjective discount factor b greater
than one.  Unlike in an infinite horizon setting in an OLG framework  b < 1 is  not  necessary  for  the  existence  of
equilibrium.  Hence, we also investigate the equilibrium in economies with annual subjective discount factor equal to
1.04.  The results are insensitive to the value of the subjective discount factor.11
the wage and income variables.  This follows from the homogeneity introduced by the constant-
RRA preferences.
20
This property of equilibrium security prices implies that the equilibrium joint probability
distribution of the bond and equity returns is invariant to the level of the  exogenous  macro-
economic variables for a fixed y, w
1 correlation structure.  Rather, the distribution depends on a
set of fundamental ratios and correlations.  (i) the average share of income  going  to  labor, E
[w
1+w
0] /E [y]; (ii) the average share of income going to the labor of the young, w
0 /E [y]; (iii) the
average share of income going to interest on government debt, b/E [y]; (iv) the coefficient  of
variation of the 20-year wage income of the middle aged,  (w
1)/E(w
1);  (v)  the  coefficient  of
variation of the 20-year aggregate income,  (y)/E(y); and (vi) the 20-year autocorrelation of the
labor income, corr (w
1
t , w
1
t-1); (vii) the 20-year autocorrelation of the aggregate income, corr (yt ,
yt-1); and (viii) the 20-year cross-correlation, corr (yt , w
1
t).
Accordingly, we calibrate the model on ranges of the above moments (i)-(viii).  There are
enough degrees of freedom to permit the construction of a 4x4 transition matrix that exhibits a
particular type of symmetry.  Specifically, the joint process on income (y) and wage  of  the
middle-aged (w
1) is modeled as a simple Markov chain with transition matrix.
(,)(,)(,)(,) (,) (,) (,) (,) YwYwYwYw H Yw H Yw H Yw H Yw +D-D -D+D 
(3.2)
where the condition
 +   +   + H = 1 (3.3)
ensures that the row sums of the elements of the transition matrix  are one.    There  are nine
parameters to be determined: Y1 / E [y], Y2 / E [y], w1
1 / E [y], w2
1 / E [y],  ,  ,  ,  D , and H
21. 
                     
20 For the unconstrained economy, this statement is proved in Lemma A.1, Appendix A of the unabridged version of this
paper, available from the authors.
21 In tables 2, 3, and 6, the matrix parameters corresponding to the indicated panels are as follows:   = 0.5298,   =12
These parameters are chosen to satisfy the eight target moments and the condition (3.3).  As it
turns out, these parameters are such that all the elements of the transition matrix are positive.
The  single  most  serious  challenge  to  the  calibration  is  the  estimation  of  the  above
unconditional moments.  Recall that the wage income of the middle-aged and the aggregate income
are 20-year aggregates.  Thus, even a century-long time series provides only five non-overlapping
observations, resulting in large standard errors of the  point  estimates.    Standard econometric
methods designed to extract more information from the time series, such as the utilization of
overlapping observations or the fitting of high-frequency, high-order, time-series models, only
marginally increase the effective number of non-overlapping observations and leave the standard
errors large.
We thus rely in large measure in an extensive sensitivity analysis, with the range of values
considered as follows:
i.  The average share of income going to labor, E [w
1+w
0] /E [y].  In the U.S. economy, this
ratio is about .66 to .75, depending on the historical period  and  the  manner of  adjusting
capital income.
The model considered  in  this  paper,  however,  is  implicitly  concerned  only  with  the
fraction of the population that owns financial assets, at least at some stage of their life cycle,
and it is the labor income share of that group that should matter.  For the time period for
which the equity premium puzzle was originally stated, about 25% of the population held
financial assets (Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Blume and Zeldes (1993)); that fraction has
risen to its current level of about 40%.  In our borrowing-constrained economy, the fraction
of  the  population  owning  financial  assets  is  .33,  midway  between  the  aforementioned
estimates.  We acknowledge, however, that age is not the sole determinant of ownership of
financial assets.  Nevertheless, it is likely that the share of income to labor is probably lower
                                                                   
0.0202,   = 0.0247, H = 0.4253 and D =0.01 (top left).   = 0.8393,   = 0.0607,   = 0.0742, H = 0.0258 and D =0.03
(top right).   = 0.5496,   = 0.0004,   = 0.0034, H = 0.4466 and D =0.03 (bottom left).   = 0.8996,   = 0.0004,   =
0.0034, H = 0.0966 and  D =0.03 (bottom right).We do not report our choice of Y, W etc because the returns in this
economy are scale invariant and thus these values are not uniquely determined.13
for the security owning class than the population at large.  In light of these comments, we set
the ratio E [w
1+w
0] /E [y] in the lower half of the documented range (.66, .70).
ii.  The average share of income going to the labor of the young, w
0 / E [y].  This share is
set in the range (.16, .20), sufficiently small to guarantee that the young have the propensity
to  borrow  and  render  the  borrowing  constraint  binding  in  the  borrowing-constrained
economy.
Our model presumes a high ratio of expected middle-aged income to the income of the
young, one that implies a 4.5% per year annual real wage growth (twenty-year time period). 
Campbell et al. (1999) report that the age profile of labor income is much less upwardly
sloped for less well-educated groups (see their figure 1).  We would argue that this group is
less likely to own stocks or long-term government bonds, so that we are in effect modeling
the age profiles of labor income only of the well-educated stock holding class.  Assuming no
trend in factor shares, overall labor income will grow at the same rate as national income,
which is about 3%.  Assuming that  the  50%  of  the  population  who  do  not  own  stock
experience only a 1.5% per year (as suggested by the Campbell et al. figure) average increase
in wage income, the wage growth of the more highly educated stockholding class must then be
in the neighborhood of 4.5% per year which is what we assume.
We have constructed a model in which there are stockholders and non-stockholders with
the latter experiencing slower labor income growth.  The general results of the present paper
are unaffected by this generalization.
iii.  The average share of income going to interest on government debt, b / E [y].  This is set
at .03, consistent with the US historical experience.
iv.  The  coefficient  of  variation  of  the  20-year  wage  income  of  the  middle-aged,
(w
1) / E(w
1).  The comparative return distributions generated by the constrained and  the
unconstrained versions of the model depend crucially on this coefficient.  Ideally, we would
like the calibration to reflect the fact that the young face large idiosyncratic uncertainty in
their future labor income, generated by uncertainty in the choice of career and on their relative14
success in their chosen career.  Nevertheless, consumer heterogeneity within a generation is
disallowed  in  our  formal  model  in  order  to  isolate  and  explore  the  implications  of
heterogeneity across generations in a parsimonious way.
We are unaware of any study that estimates the coefficient of variation of the 20-year (or,
annual) wage income of the middle aged, (w
1) / E(w
1).  Creedy (1985), in a study of select
“white collar” professions in the U.K, estimates that the annual coefficient  (w) / E(w) is in
the range 0.31-0.57; in a study of women, Cox (1984) estimates the coefficient to be about
0.25.    Gourinchas  and  Parker  (1999)  estimate  the  annual  cross-sectional  coefficient  of
variation to be about 0.5.  Considering the above estimates, we calibrate the coefficient of
variation to be 0.25.
v.  The  coefficient  of  variation  of  the  20-year  aggregate  income,  (y)/ E(y).    This
coefficient  captures  the  variation  in  detrended,  20-year  aggregate  income.    In  the  U.S.
economy the log of the detrended (Hodrick-Prescott filtered) quarterly aggregate income is
highly autocorrelated and has standard deviation of about 1.8%.  This information provides
little guidance in choosing the coefficient of variation of the 20-year aggregate income.  We
consider the values 0.20 and 0.25.
vi.  The 20-year auto-correlations and cross-correlation of the labor income of the middle-
aged  and  the  aggregate  income,  corr(yt,wt), corr(y t,yt-1) and corr(w t
1,w t -1
1 ).    Lacking
sufficient time-series data to estimate the 20-year auto-correlations and cross-correlation, we
present results for a variety of auto-correlation and cross-correlation structures.
In Table 1, we report empirical estimates of  the  mean and  standard  deviation of  the
annualized, 20-year holding-period return on the S&P 500 total return series; and on the Ibbotson
US Government Treasury Long Term bond yield.    For  years  prior  to  1926,  the  series  was
augmented using Shiller’s S&P 500 series and the 20-year geometric mean of the one-year bond
returns.  Real returns are CPI adjusted.  The annualized mean (on equity or the bond) return is
defined as the sample mean of [log{20-year holding period return}]/20.  The annualized standard
deviation of the (equity or bond) return is defined as the sample standard deviation of [log{20-15
year  holding  period  return}]/÷20.    The  annualized mean equity  premium  is  defined  as  the
difference of the mean return on equity and the mean return on the bond.  The standard deviation
of the premium is defined  as  the  sample  standard  deviation of  [log{20-year nominal  equity
return} - log{the 20-year nominal bond return}]/÷20.  Estimates on returns cover the sample
period 1/1889 - 12/1999, with 92  overlapping  observations  and  the  sample  period  1/1926  -
12/1999 with 55 overlapping observations.  We do not report standard errors, as these are large:
on nominal returns, we have only four and on real returns, we have only two non-overlapping
observations.
In Table 1, the real mean equity return is 6% - 7% with a standard deviation of 13% -
15%; the mean bond return is about 1%; and the mean equity premium is 5% - 6%.  Since the
equity in our model is the claim not just to corporate dividends but also to all risky capital in the
economy, the mean equity premium that we aim to match is about 3%.
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The properties of the stationary equilibria of the calibrated economies are reported  in
Tables 2 - 3.  In Table 2, we set RRA = 6,  (y) / E [y] = 0.20 and  (w
1) / E [w
1] = 0.25; and in
Table 3, we set RRA = 4,  (y) / E [y] = 0.25 and  (w
1) / E [w
1] = 0.25.
Our terminology is the same for both the constrained and the unconstrained economies. 
The one-period (20-year) bond is referred to as the bond.  The bond is in zero net supply and its
price is defined as the private valuation of the bond by the middle-aged consumer.
22 
23   The
consol bond, which is in positive net supply, is referred to as the consol.
For all securities, the annualized mean return is defined as mean of log{20-year holding
period return}/20.  The annualized standard deviation of the (equity, bond or consol) return is
defined as  the  standard  deviation of  [log{20-year  holding  period  return}]/÷20.    The  mean
                     
22 Specifically, it is the shadow price of the bond determined by the marginal rate of substitution of the middle-aged
consumer.  It would be meaningless to report the private valuation of the bond by the young consumer because the young
consumer would like to sell the bond short (borrow) but the borrowing constraint is binding.
23 Specifically, it is the shadow price of the bond determined by the marginal rate of substitution of the middle-aged
consumer.  The private valuation of the bond by the young consumer is also well defined.  We have calculated both private
valuations of the bond and they agree to the second decimal point.  Essentially the two traded securities, the equity and
the consol, come close to completing the market and the private valuation of the (one-period) bond by the young and the16
annualized equity premium return over the bond return, “MEAN PRM/BOND”, is defined as
the difference between the mean return on equity and the mean return on the bond.  The standard
deviation of the premium of equity return over the bond return, “STD PRM/BOND”, is defined
as the standard deviation of [log{20-year nominal equity return} - log{the 20-year nominal bond
return}]/÷20.    The  mean  premium  of  equity  return  over  the  consol  return,  “MEAN
PRM/CONSOL”, and the standard deviation of the premium of equity return over the consol
return, “STD PRM/CONSOL”, are defined in a similar manner.
The single most important observation across all the cases reported in Tables 2 - 4 is that
the mean (20-year or consol) bond return roughly doubles when the  borrowing  constraint is
relaxed.  This observation is robust to the calibration of the correlation and auto-correlation of
the labor income of the middle-aged with the aggregate income.  In these examples, the borrowing
constraint goes a long way, albeit not all the way, towards resolving the risk-free rate puzzle. 
This, of course, is the first part of the thesis of our paper: if the young are able to borrow, they
do so and purchase equity; the borrowing activity of the young raises the bond return, thereby
exacerbating the risk-free rate puzzle.
The second observation across all the borrowing-constrained cases reported in Tables 2 -
3 is that the minimum mean equity premium over the 20-year bond is about half the target of 3%.
Further, the premium decreases when the borrowing constraint is relaxed, in some cases quite
substantially.  This is the second part of the thesis of our paper: if the young are able to borrow,
the increase in the bond return induces the middle-aged to shift their portfolio holdings in favor of
the bond; the increase in the demand for equity by the young and the decrease in the demand for
equity by the middle-aged work in opposite directions; on balance, the effect is to increase the
return  on  both  equity  and  the  bond  while  simultaneously  shrinking  the  equity  premium. 
Although the mean equity premium decreases in all the cases when the borrowing constraint is
relaxed, the amount by which the premium decreases is the largest in the top panels of Tables 2-3
in which the labor income of the middle-aged and aggregate income are negatively correlated.
The third observation across all the cases reported in Tables 2 - 3 is that the correlation of
                                                                   
middle-aged practically coincide, even though the bond is not traded in the equilibrium.17
the labor income of the middle-aged and the equity premium over the 20-year bond, corr (w
1,
PRM/BOND), is much smaller in absolute value
24 than the exogenously-imposed correlation of
the labor income of the middle-aged and the dividend, corr (w
1, d).  Thus, equity is attractive to
the young because of the large mean equity premium and the low correlation of the premium with
the wage income of the middle-aged, thereby corroborating another important dimension of our
model.  In equilibrium, it turns out that the correlation of the wage income of the middle-aged and
the equity return is low.
25  The young consumers would like to invest in equity because equity
return has low correlation with their future consumption, if their future consumption is derived
from  their  future  wage  income.    However,  the  borrowing  constraint  prevents  them  from
purchasing equity on margin.  Furthermore, since the young consumers are relatively poor and
have an incentive to smooth their intertemporal consumption, they are unwilling to decrease their
current consumption in order to save by investing in equity.  Therefore, the young choose not
participate in the equity market.
The fourth observation is that the borrowing constraint results in standard deviations of
the annualized, 20-year equity and bond returns which are lower than in the unconstrained case
and which are comparable to the target values in Table 1.
In Table 4, we present  the  consumption  of  the  young,  middle-aged  and  old  and  the
conditional first moments of the returns at the four states of the borrowing-constrained economy.
The economy is calibrated as in the first two columns of the top left  panel  of  Table  2  and
corresponds to the case where RRA = 6,  (y) / E [y] = 0.20,  (w
1)/E [w
1] = 0.25, corr(yt,yt-1)
= corr(wt
1,w t-1
1 ) = 0.1 and corr(yt,wt) = 0.1.  This is our base case.  As expected, the young simply
consume their endowment, which in our model is constant across states.  The consumption of the
middle-aged is also smooth.  The  consumption  of  the  old  is  surprisingly  variable;  it  is  this
variability that induces the middle-aged to invest partly in bonds, despite the high mean premium
of equity over bonds.  The conditional first moments of the returns are substantially different
across the states.
                     
24 This is consistent with the low correlation between the return on equity and wages reported by Davis and Willen (2000).
25 The low correlation of the wage income of the middle-aged and the equity return is a property of the equilibrium and18
5.  EXTENSIONS
5.1 Limited Consumer Participation in the Capital Markets
Our life-cycle economy induces a type of limited participation, that of young consumers
in the stock market and that of old consumers in the labor market.  However, all consumers
participate in the capital markets in two out of the three phases of the lifecycle: as savers in their
middle age, and as dis-savers in their old age.
26  In this section, we introduce a second type of
consumers, the passive consumers, who never participate in the capital markets.  The passive
consumers are introduced in order to accommodate, albeit in an ad hoc fashion, a different type of
limited participation of consumers in the capital markets, that addressed in Mankiw and Zeldes
(1991), Blume and Zeldes (1993), and Haliassos and Bertaut (1995).  We refer to the consumers
that participate in capital markets in two  out  of  the  three  phases  of  the  lifecycle  as  active
consumers.
In calibrating this alternative economy, we assume that 60% of the consumers are passive
and 40% are active.  Since only two-thirds of the active consumers participate in the capital
markets in any period, the percentage of the population (of active and passive consumers) that
participate in the capital markets in any period is 26%.
We assume that both passive and active consumers receive wage income $19,000 when
young, and $0 when old. The passive consumers receive income $33,000 when middle-aged.  The
active consumers receive income either $90,125 or $ 34,125 when middle-aged. The results are
presented in Table 5 and are contrasted to our ‘prime’ case in Table 2, the upper left panel. The
results are essentially unchanged —the premium is somewhat higher—attesting to the robustness
of the model along this dimension of limited participation.
5.2 Bequests
                                                                   
obtains for a wide range of values of the assumed correlation of the wage income of the middle-aged and the dividend.
26 For the unconstrained version, all ages participate.19
A simple way to relax the no-bequest assumption is to interpret the “consumption” of
the old as the sum of the old consumers’ consumption, and their bequests.  As long as bequests
skip a generation and are received by the borrowing-unconstrained middle-aged, as it is often the
case, the young remain borrowing-constrained, and our results remain intact.
More generally, we distinguish between the old consumers’ actual consumption and their
bequests—the joy of giving.  We  introduce  a  utility  function  for  the  old  consumers  that  is
separable  over  actual  consumption  and  bequests.    Furthermore,  we  specify  that  the  old
consumers are satiated at a low level of actual consumption.  Such a model would imply that the
middle-aged consumers would save primarily to bequeath wealth rather than to consume in their
old age.  This interpretation is interesting in its own right and makes the OLG model consistent
with the empirical observation that the correlation between the (actual) consumption of the old
and the stock market return is low.
5.3  Margin Requirements
A novel feature of our paper is that the limited stock market participation by the young
consumers arises endogenously as the result of an assumed borrowing constraint.  The young
because of their steep earnings and consumption profile would not choose voluntarily to reduce
their period zero consumption in order to save in the form of equity.  They would, however, be
willing to borrow against their future labor income to buy equity and increase their period zero
consumption but this is precluded by the borrowing constraint.  The restriction on borrowing
against future labor income is realistic.  We have motivated it by recognizing that human capital
alone does not collateralize major loans in modern economies for reasons of moral hazard and
adverse selection.  However the restriction on borrowing to invest in equity may be challenged on
the grounds that in reality consumers have the opportunity to purchase equity and stock index
futures on margin and purchase  a  home with  a  15%  down  payment.    We investigate these
possibilities in the context of the equilibrium of the borrowing-constrained economies.
We define M to be the dollar amount that a consumer can borrow for one (20-year) period20
with one dollar down payment and invest M + 1 dollars in equity on margin.  That is, the margin
requirement is 1/(M+1), which is  approximately  equal to  M
-1  for  large  M.    We report  the
maximum value of M that still deters young investors from purchasing equity on margin.  Tables
2 - 4 display the value of M in the equilibrium of all the borrowing-constrained economies.  In all
cases, M exceeds the value of 55: a young consumer is unwilling to sacrifice even one dollar of
immediate  consumption  to  put  up  as  margin  for  the  purchase  of  equity  worth  $56.    This
demonstrates that our results remain unchanged, if the borrowing constraint to purchase equity is
replaced by even a small margin requirement of 2 %.
5.4  Firm Leverage
We also  investigate the  possibility  that  investors  evade  the  margin  requirement  by
purchasing the equity of a levered firm, where the “firm” is the claim to the dividend process.  A
simple variation of the above calculations shows that a margin requirement of 4% suffices to
deter the borrowing-constrained young from purchasing the levered equity even if the debt-to-
equity ratio  is  1:1.    We conclude  that  our  results  remain  effectively  unchanged  even if  we
recognize the ability of firms to borrow.
5.5 Other Market Configurations
So far, we have assumed that the equity and the consol bond are in positive net supply,
while the one-period (20-year) bond is in zero net supply.  Here we consider a variation of the
economy in which the equity and the one-period (20-year) bond are in positive net supply, while
the consol bond is in zero net supply.  We calibrate the economy using the same parameters as
those used in Table 2.  The properties of  the  equilibrium  are presented  in  Table  6  and  are
contrasted with the properties of the equilibrium in Table 2.  It is clear that the major conclusion
of the paper remains robust to this variation of the economy: the borrowing constraint increases
the equity premium.  Furthermore, security returns in the constrained economy remain uniformly
below their unconstrained counterparts.21
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have addressed ongoing questions on the historical mean and standard deviation of the
returns on equities and bonds and on the equilibrium demand for these securities in the context of
a stationary, overlapping-generations economy in which consumers are subject to a borrowing
constraint.  The particular combination of these elements captures the effect of the borrowing
constraint on the investors’ saving and dis-saving behavior over their life cycle.  We find in all
cases that the imposition of the borrowing constraint reduces the risk free rate and increases the
risk premium, in some cases quite significantly.  However, the standard deviation of the security
returns remain too low relative to the data.  On a qualitative basis, our results mirror effects in the
larger  society:  the  decline  in  the  premium  documented  in  Blanchard  (1992)  has  been
contemporaneous with a substantial increase in individual indebtedness.
The model is intentionally sparse in its assumptions in order to convey the basic message
in the simplest possible way.  It can be enriched in various ways that enhance its realism.  For
example, we may increase the number of generations from three to sixty, representing consumers
of ages twenty to eighty in annual increments.  In such a model, we expect that the youngest
consumers are borrowing-constrained for a number of years and invest neither in equity nor in
bonds; thereafter they invest in a portfolio of equity and bonds, with the proportion of equity in
their portfolio decreasing, as they grow older and the attractiveness of equity diminishes.  It is
possible to increase the endowment of young consumers to reflect inter-generational transfers,
and make the endowment of the young random and different across consumers.  These changes
will have pricing implications to the extent that the young investors  who  are currently  infra
marginal in the equity and bond markets become marginal.  We can model the pension income and
social security  benefits  of  the  old  consumers.    It  is  possible  to  introduce  heterogeneity  of
consumers within a generation.  We can model GDP growth as a stationary process rather than
modeling (de-trended) GDP level as a stationary process.  We can specify distinct production
sectors, endogenize production, endogenize the labor-leisure tradeoff, and model the government22
sector in a more realistic manner than we have done in the paper.  We suspect that in all these
cases the essential message of our paper will survive: the borrowing-constraint has the effect of
lowering the interest rate and raising the equity premium.23
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TABLE 1
Real Returns
1/1889 - 12/1999 1/1926 - 12/1999
EQUITY BOND PREMIUM EQUITY BOND PREMIUM
MEAN 6.15% 0.82% 5.34% 6.71% 0.14% 6.58%
STD 13.95% 7.40% 14.32% 15.79% 7.25% 15.21%
Nominal Returns
1/1889 - 12/1999 1/1926 - 12/1999
EQUITY BOND PREMIUM EQUITY BOND PREMIUM
MEAN 9.20% 3.86% 5.34% 10.55% 3.97% 6.58%
STD 13.88% 7.27% 14.32% 14.47% 8.49% 15.21%
We report empirical estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the annualized, 20-year holding-period-return on the
S&P 500 total return series; and on the Ibbotson US Government Treasury Long Term bond yield.  For years prior to 1926,
the series was augmented using Shiller’s S&P 500 series and the 20-year geometric mean of the one-year bond returns. 
Real returns are CPI adjusted.  The annualized mean (on equity or the bond) return is defined as the sample mean of the
[log{20-year holding period return}]/20.  The annualized standard deviation of the (equity or bond) return is defined as
the sample standard deviation of the [log{20-year holding period return}]/÷20.  The mean equity premium is defined as
the difference of the mean return on equity and the mean return on the bond.  The standard deviation of the premium is
defined as the sample standard deviation of the [log {20-year nominal return on equity} - log {the 20-year nominal return
on the bond}] / ÷20.  Estimates on returns cover the sample period 1/1889 - 12/1999, with 92 overlapping observations
and the sample period 1/1926 - 12/1999 with 55 overlapping observations.30
TABLE 2
a
CORRELATION  ( y, w
1 ) = 0.1
LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR.
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.1)
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR.
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.8)
BORROWING
CONSTRAINED
BORROWING
UNCONSTRAINED
BORROWING
CONSTRAINED
BORROWING
UNCONSTRAINED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 8.4 10.2 9.4 12.2
STD OF EQUITY
RET.
23.0 42.0 26.5 26.5
MEAN BOND RET. 5.1 9.0 6.7 11.1
STD OF BOND RET. 15.4 27.6 20.8 11.9
MEAN PRM/BOND 3.4 1.1 2.6 1.0
STD PRM/BOND 18.4 31.6 12.8 2.5
MEAN CONSOL RET. 3.7 9.9 4.5 11.1
STD OF CONSOL
RET
19.1 27.6 19.0 11.9
MEAN PRM/CONSOL 4.7 0.3 4.9 1.0
STD PRM/CONSOL 10.5 5.2 10.1 9.2
MARGIN
-1 , M 530 N.A. 170 N.A.
CORR (w
1 , d ) -0.43 -0.43 -0.42 -0.42
CORR(w
1, PRM/BOND) -0.02 0.00 0.13 0.58
CORRELATION  ( y, w
1 ) = 0.8
LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR.
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.1)
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR.
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.8)
BORROWING
CONSTRAINED
BORROWING
UNCONSTRAINED
BORROWING
CONSTRAINED
BORROWING
UNCONSTRAINED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 7.9 12.7 8.3 13.9
STD OF EQUITY
RET.
18.8 29.8 14.9 16.2
MEAN BOND RET. 5.8 11.3 6.9 12.9
STD OF BOND RET. 15.9 25.8 10.6 12.6
MEAN PRM/BOND 2.0 1.4 1.4 0.9
STD PRM/BOND 11.1 13.4 9.8 10.4
MEAN CONSOL RET. 6.5 11.8 6.7 12.9
STD OF CONSOL
RET
17.2 26.6 10.3 12.8
MEAN PRM/CONSOL 0.7 0.56 1.6 1.0
STD PRM/CONSOL 6.0 3.8 7.4 1.2
MARGIN
-1 , M 164 N.A. 156 N.A.
CORR (w
1 , d ) 0.55 0.55 0.36 0.91
CORR(w
1, PRM/BOND) 0.01 -0.04 0.19 0.13
                     
a We set RRA = 6,  (y) / E[y] = 0.20 and  (w
1) / E[w
1] = 0.25.  The variables are defined in the main text of the paper.  The
consol bond is in positive net supply and the one-period (20-year) bond is in zero net supply.31
TABLE 3
a
CORRELATION  ( y, w
1 ) = 0.1
LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR.
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.1)
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR.
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.8)
BORROWING
CONSTRAINED
BORROWING
UNCONSTRAINED
BORROWING
CONSTRAINED
BORROWING
UNCONSTRAINED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 9.2 12.2 9.7 12.9
STD OF EQUITY
RET.
19.3 29.3 25.6 20.9
MEAN BOND RET. 6.5 10.2 7.6 11.8
STD OF BOND RET. 14.9 21.6 20.3 10.6
MEAN PRM/BOND 2.7 2.0 2.1 1.1
STD PRM/BOND 13.6 20.7 10.4 16.9
MEAN CONSOL RET. 5.8 10.7 5.7 11.8
STD OF CONSOL
RET
17.3 22.2 19.0 10.5
MEAN PRM/CONSOL 3.4 1.5 4.0 1.1
STD PRM/CONSOL 7.0 3.0 8.1 0.8
MARGIN
-1 , M   140 NA 142 NA
CORR (w
1 , d ) -0.30 -0.30 -0.31 -0.31
CORR(w
1, PRM/BOND) -0.01 0.00 0.06 .42
CORRELATION  ( y, w
1 ) = 0.8
LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR.
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.1)
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR.
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.8)
BORROWING
CONSTRAINED
BORROWING
UNCONSTRAINED
BORROWING
CONSTRAINED
BORROWING
UNCONSTRAINED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 8.7 12.9 9.3 14.1
STD OF EQUITY
RET.
17.3 24.6 12.8 14.1
MEAN BOND RET. 6.6 11.3 8.0 13.1
STD OF BOND RET. 14.1 21.1 8.7 9.7
MEAN PRM/BOND 2.1 1.6 1.3 0.9
STD PRM/BOND 10.7 12.5 7.9 9.2
MEAN CONSOL RET. 7.2 11.7 7.7 13.1
STD OF CONSOL
RET
15.2 21.8 8.6 9.6
MEAN PRM/CONSOL 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.0
STD PRM/CONSOL 4.6 2.5 5.8 0.4
MARGIN
-1 , M 162 NA 151 NA
CORR (w
1 , d ) 0.69 0.69 0.53 0.53
CORR(w
1, PRM/BOND) 0.01 -0.03 0.23 -0.40
                     
a We set RRA = 4,  (y) / E[y] = 0.25 and  (w
1) / E[w
1] = 0.25 .  The variables are defined in the main text of the paper.  The
consol bond is in positive net supply and the one-period (20-year) bond is in zero net supply.32
TABLE 4
a
STATE 1 STATE 2 STATE 3 STATE 4 UNCONDITIONAL
PROBABILITY . 275 . 225 . 225 . 274 1
CONSUMPTION OF THE
YOUNG
19,000 19,000 19,000 19,000 19,000
CONSUMPTION OF THE
MIDDLE-AGED
36,967 33,003 27,335 28,539 31,591
CONSUMPTION OF THE
OLD
62,232 26,594 71,864 31,058 47,834
MEAN EQUITY RETURN 4.7 5.4 12.9 11.0 8.4
MEAN BOND RETURN 2.5 0.8 7.4 9.2 5.1
MEAN PRM/BOND 2.2 4.6 5.5 2.1 3.4
MEAN CONSOL RETURN 2.3 -1.4 4.7 8.8 3.7
MEAN PRM/CONSOL 2.4 6.9 8.2 2.5 4.7
MARGIN
-1, M 1212 386 178 373 530
                     
a We set RRA = 6,  (y) / E[y] = 0.20 ,  (w
1) / E[w
1] = 0.25 ,corr(y
t,y
t-1)= corr(w
t
1,w
t-1
1
 ) = 0.1 and  corr(y
t,wt)= 0.1.  The
variables are defined in the main text of the paper.  The consol bond is in positive net supply and the one-period (20-year)
bond is in zero net supply.33
TABLE 5
 a
MEAN EQUITY RET. 17.4
STD OF EQUITY RET. 47.6
MEAN BOND RET. 12.6
STD OF BOND RET. 43.5
MEAN PRM/BOND 4.8
STD PRM/BOND 23.5
MEAN CONSOL RET. 9.7
STD OF CONSOL RET 45.2
MEAN PRM/CONSOL 7.7
STD PRM/CONSOL 12.2
MARGIN
-1 , M 927
CORR (w
1 , d ) -0.42
CORR( w
1, PRM/BOND) -0.03
                     
a The serial autocorrelation of y and of w
1 is 0.1.  The table presents the borrowing-constrained case.  We set RRA = 6,  (y)
/ E [y] = 0.20,  (w
1) / E [w
1] = 0.25, W (0) / E [y] = 0.19, wpassive (1) / E [y] = 0.20, E [wactive (1)] / E [y] = 0.25, W (2) / E [y] = 0
and the proportion of active consumers 40%.  The variables are defined in the main text of the paper.  The consol bond is in
positive net supply and the one-period (20-year) bond is in zero net supply.34
TABLE 6
a
CORRELATION  ( y, w
1 ) = 0.1
LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR.
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.1)
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR.
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.8)
BORROWING
CONSTRAINED
BORROWING
UNCONSTRAINED
BORROWING
CONSTRAINED
BORROWING
UNCONSTRAINED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 6.9 9.2 8.1 10.7
STD OF EQUITY
RET.
18.1 42.9 24.9 26.7
MEAN BOND RET. 4.6 8.2 6.2 9.0
STD OF BOND RET. 15.3 29.3 20.8 19.0
MEAN PRM/BOND 2.3 1.1 1.9 1.7
STD PRM/BOND 10.7 31.3 8.6 17.8
MARGIN
-1 , M 178 N.A. 170 N.A.
CORR (w
1 , d ) -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43
CORR(w
1, PRM/BOND) -0.004 -0.004 0.03 0.67
CORRELATION  ( y, w
1 ) = 0.8
LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR.
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.1)
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR.
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.8)
BORROWING
CONSTRAINED
BORROWING
UNCONSTRAINED
BORROWING
CONSTRAINED
BORROWING
UNCONSTRAINED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 7.5 12.5 7.9 13.5
STD OF EQUITY
RET.
17.8 29.9 11.6 16.6
MEAN BOND RET. 5.6 11.1 6.7 12.5
STD OF BOND RET. 15.8 25.7 10.4 12.8
MEAN PRM/BOND 1.8 1.4 1.2 0.9
STD PRM/BOND 8.7 13.4 6.4 10.1
MARGIN
-1 , M 164 N.A. 156 N.A.
CORR (w
1 , d ) 0.55 0.55 0.36 0.36
CORR(w
1, PRM/BOND) 0.01 0.01 0.37 0.20
                     
a We set RRA = 6,  (y) / E[y] = 0.20 and  (w
1) / E[w
1] = 0.25.  The variables are defined in the main text of the paper.  The
consol bond is in positive net supply and the one-period (20-year) bond is in zero net supply.